

Parental Background and Lifestyle Differentiation in Eastern Europe: Social, Political, and Cultural Intergenerational Transmission in Five Former Socialist Societies

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Destratification processes in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe reduced the opportunities parents had to provide their children with favorable conditions for success in life. As a consequence, the relevance of parental social background in explaining high-culture participation and material wealth was believed to be limited. Several scholars, however, argued that intergenerational social inequalities persisted and that new forms of political and cultural transmission developed. In this article, we studied these claims and examined the effects of parental social, political, and cultural resources on their children's cultural and material lifestyle. The data we used stem from five national representative and fully comparable surveys conducted in 1993 in Bulgaria ($N = 3515$), the Czech Republic ($N = 4596$), Hungary ($N = 3395$), Poland ($N = 2747$), and Slovakia ($N = 3771$). Our analyses show that for high culture participation, parental cultural resources are highly relevant. Particularly in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia these parental resources of cultural access are even more important factors than an individual's own attributes. Furthermore, indirect effects of parental political and socioeconomic resources could be established. Regarding material wealth, continuing inequality is revealed as well. Parental socioeconomic resources predominantly affect material consumption indirectly through an enhancement of individual resources. Political parental resources are of value, especially in Slovakia and Bulgaria. In general, we conclude that in spite of the far-reaching destratification policies in these five former socialist countries, lifestyle differentiation shortly after the breakdown of socialism is still largely determined by the transmission of inequalities over generations. © 2000 Academic Press

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In the socialist countries of Eastern Europe official governmental policy designed to reduce social inequality was in effect for over 40 years. Destratification measures like the abolition of private property and limiting access for children from bourgeois backgrounds to the higher educational levels were implemented. Consequently, parents' opportunities to provide their children with favorable conditions to be successful in life were believed to have been reduced. In spite of these egalitarian policies, sociological research has acknowledged the persistence of social and economic inequality throughout Eastern Europe (Machonin, 1970; Konrad and Szelényi, 1979; Beskidova and Tucek, 1990). In this article, we elaborate on the processes generating visible and expressive aspects of social inequality, that is, cultural and material lifestyle differentiation. Our survey focuses on five Eastern European nations (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) in 1993.

In all societies, in both socialist and nonsocialist countries, there are apparent differences with respect to participation in high culture and material wealth (Machonin, 1970; Wnuk-Lipinski, 1983; Robert and Sagi, 1996). These distinctions are clear and visible expressions of social inequality. Scholars theorizing on the determinants of cultural and material lifestyle differentiation more often consider the importance of parental background. Empirical studies examining lifestyle differentiation, however, mainly concentrate on the importance of individuals' education, financial resources, and occupational characteristics. As a result, the role of intergenerational transmission of this type of inequality has been disregarded. There were, of course, stratification and mobility studies that did focus on parental background features, but these predominantly emphasized children's educational and occupational attainment, not their lifestyle. Consequently, meaningful aspects of social inequality in society, cultural participation and material wealth, have been overlooked. By examining the effects of both parental and individual resources on cultural participation and material wealth in this article, we aim to bring parental background back into empirical lifestyle research.

In addition, research on the effects of parental background characteristics on cultural and material lifestyle differentiation is of special interest with respect to the former socialist nations of Eastern Europe. It is generally believed that the egalitarian policy measures taken there weakened parents' opportunities to provide their children with capacities and skills that enhance social inequality (Ganzeboom et al., 1990). Consequently, in the former socialist societies the impact of parental background on social lifestyle differentiation is thought to have been reduced. As was the case, the Marxist governments in all the Eastern European countries underlined the importance of a "just" and "equal" allocation of material wealth and living conditions. To achieve this egalitarian distribution, several destratifying policy measures, such as income redistribution, limited access to higher education for the bourgeoisie, and expropriating the property of farmers and the nobility, were implemented. Studying lifestyle differentiation in

Eastern Europe therefore gives an opportunity to examine whether the communist destratification policy with respect to cultural participation and material wealth was successful and whether the consequences of these measures are still visible years after the breakdown of communism.

Moreover, studying the effects of parental background on cultural and material lifestyle differentiation in Eastern Europe is of interest because it can provide information about how people react to strong redistribution policies. Several scholars have assumed that in societies where, either due to state intervention or processes of modernization, the display or use of economic resources decline, people will apply alternative compensating transmission strategies (Bourdieu, 1984). For example, it is suggested that people increasingly provide their children with better chances by means of cultural transmission, that is, by instilling cultural values, codes, and capital that help them to attain success in life (Djilas, 1957; Bourdieu, 1984; DeGraaf, 1986). Thus, when we examine the effects of parental resources on lifestyle differentiation, we focus on both socioeconomic and cultural parental resources.

Another good reason to study the causes of lifestyle differentiation in Eastern Europe is that in the communist era, political power played an important role in the redistribution process. Nearly all the reallocation of income, goods, and power took place as a result of the dominant position of the ruling Communist party. In this redistribution operation, individuals affiliated with the Communist party probably assured themselves more goods and privileges than nonmembers (Morrison, 1984). Political power made the access to economic and cultural privileges easier. As a result, even after the collapse of the communist state systems, social differentiation in cultural participation and material consumption might at least partly be explained by differences in political resources. It is not likely that previously economic and cultural advantaged groups, the politically powerful, would give up their privileges easily. Hence, our five Eastern European countries are good examples for studying the impact of political resources on lifestyle differentiation and the impact of the intergenerational transmission of inequalities therein (Konrad and Szelényi, 1979; Szelényi, 1987). Indeed, if we find indications of strong effects of (parental) party affiliation on lifestyle expressions, even after the collapse of socialism, this would be strong evidence for unintended consequences of socialist redistribution policies.

Given this our main question concerns the relative strength of the parental and individual characteristics presumed to explain differences in lifestyle and reads as follows:

To what extent does social differentiation in cultural participation and material consumption occur in five Eastern European countries (in 1993), and how can parental background resources and individual characteristics explain these differences?

To broaden this issue and to gain greater insight in the process of transmitting

social inequality over generations in Eastern Europe, more specifically, our research question reads:

To what extent does the transmission of inequality over generations occur through processes of social reproduction, i.e., via parental social origin, political reproduction, i.e., via parents' Communist party membership, and cultural reproduction, i.e., via parental cultural capital?

The answers to these research questions illuminate the mechanisms used to transmit social inequality with respect to lifestyle differentiation, in general, and in former socialist countries, in particular.

LIFESTYLE DIFFERENTIATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In general, research on the intergenerational transmission of inequality focuses on the attainment process with respect to education and occupation. In this article we extend the question on intergenerational transmission of social inequality to the field of lifestyle. We consider lifestyle choices to be an expression of social inequality determined by differences in individual resources, on the one hand, and parental background, on the other. Classic studies on lifestyle predominantly treat all kinds of decisions on tastes and preferences as dependent on the social position of an individual in society (Veblen, 1899; Weber, 1966). Sobel (1981) stresses that lifestyle differences are rooted in the reference sets that individuals maintain. According to Sobel, these reference sets are determined by the demands of an individual's social position. Subsequently, Sobel argues that lifestyle variation stems from the differentiation within the social structure. DiMaggio (1994) emphasizes that hardly any aspect of human experience is uncorrelated with some dimension of social rank, which underscores the fundamental idea that an individual's lifestyle at least partly expresses a particular social status position. The French sociologist Bourdieu is one of the most prominent scholars in lifestyle research. Bourdieu (1984) asserts that individuals distinguish themselves socially from others on all possible domains by the distinctions they make between the beautiful and the ugly. Again, it is presumed that this taste differentiation is explained by the social position of a person in society.

One of the most relevant characteristics of lifestyle expressions is their visibility in a social context. It is a simple fact that visible lifestyle expressions are commonly shared within status groups and give its members a sense of solidarity; at the same time these group-specific symbols work as a means of distinguishing one status group from others (DiMaggio, 1994). Subsequently, Sobel (1981) restricts lifestyle choices to the consumption of commodities and luxuries because these goods especially express material wealth. In contrast, Bourdieu (1984) presumes all lifestyle choices to symbolize a person's social position, material consumption as well as high-culture participation. What exactly defines a social status group is not always clear. In our article four different "social position" factors are used to explain the differentiation in lifestyle: educational attainment, income, occupational status, and previous Communist party membership. In the




FIG. 1. Model of social differentiation in material and cultural lifestyle.

explanatory model, as presented in Fig. 1, this refers to the direct effects of these individual resources on high-culture participation and material consumption.

The focus on the relation between individual resources and lifestyle as described above implies that most research on lifestyle differentiation does not regard parental background. A notable exception is a study done by Ganzeboom et al. (1990) of Hungary that examines various aspects of inequality (including housing status and cultural consumption) and relates it to parental background and socialization in the parental home. By doing so, the authors account for the intergenerational transmission of inequality. It is concluded that several aspects of a person's parental background are meaningful toward explaining lifestyle choices later in life. Similar studies for western countries have been conducted by DeGraaf and DeGraaf (1988), Mohr and DiMaggio (1995), and Niehof (1997).

Here, to study the relative impact of family background characteristics on lifestyle differentiation in Eastern Europe, we presume differences in lifestyle choices are explained by three mechanisms: social reproduction, political reproduction, and cultural reproduction (Fig. 1). The relative contribution of these concepts to the explanation of lifestyle differentiation is relevant to the answering of our research question. The explanatory model in Fig. 1 further indicates that for influences of family background on lifestyle differentiation, it is important to deal with direct and indirect effects. This is what is referred to in the second research question.

Parental Socioeconomic Resources and Lifestyle Differentiation: Social Transmission

In all industrialized countries, people from the high social strata are more successful in life than people from the lower social classes. This transmission of inequalities over generations is commonly referred to as social reproduction (Blau and Duncan, 1967; Ganzeboom et al., 1991; Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). How

parents exactly succeed in enhancing their children's life chances is a major topic in stratification and mobility research (Kurz & Muller, 1987; Ganzeboom et al., 1991). Generally, it is assumed that parents from the higher strata pass aspirations, competencies, and skills to their children that make them better qualified to reach for high-status positions. In addition, parents transmit their high status position by entitlement and the direct transfer of possessions (Ganzeboom et al., 1990).

Intergenerational social reproduction not only seems important for the inequalities in educational attainment and occupational status, but also in explaining differentiation in material wealth and high-culture participation. Parents from advantageous socioeconomic groups simply furnish their children with more talents and possibilities to enjoy high culture and to achieve material wealth. This social reproduction process occurs directly and indirectly. Direct transmission of inequality is detected when the cultural or material lifestyle is directly associated with parental socioeconomic resources. This kind of social reproduction may take place through the explicit enhancement of social, cultural, and financial resources that facilitate a preference for high culture and the maintenance and enhancement of material wealth. Indirect social reproduction takes place when a child's social position in terms of education, occupational status, and income is strengthened as a result of a profitable socioeconomic background (Wong, 1996; Niehof, 1997). Such a high status position often is accompanied by the financial and cognitive qualities that enables a person to participate in high-culture activities and possess luxury goods. For example, high-status professionals earn enough money to purchase scarce luxurious commodities and highly educated individuals will have the intellectual competency to appreciate expressions of high culture. Subsequently, the attainment of a high status position is relevant in explaining lifestyle choices (Machonin, 1970; Wesolowski and Slomczynski, 1978; Robert and Sagi, 1996).

That a person's status is important is exemplified in several empirical studies in western countries as well as in socialist Eastern Europe (Marsden et al., 1982; Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp, 1989; Robert and Sagi, 1996). Education is generally found to be the most important factor in predicting an appreciation of high-culture activities. Especially in Eastern Europe, the highly educated visit theaters and museums more often and spend more time reading than less educated people (Machonin, 1970; Wnuk-Lipinski, 1983; Gabal, 1990). On the material domain, the higher educated are also overrepresented in Eastern Europe. Even when income and parental background is accounted for, the highly educated are found more among the privileged (Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp, 1989; Ganzeboom et al., 1990; Robert and Sagi, 1996). Furthermore, belonging to the higher occupational classes seems profitable in Eastern Europe for both high-culture participation and the possession of consumer durables (Wnuk-Lipinski, 1983; Beskid and Kolosi, 1983; Beskidove and Tucek, 1990). Empirical research has demonstrated also that in Eastern Europe, people from the higher income groups are more likely to have an exclusive lifestyle. They do so by way of luxurious material consumption more than through high-culture participation (Beskid and Kolosi, 1983; Ganzeboom et al., 1990; DeGraaf, 1991; Robert and Sagi, 1996).

So, for Eastern European countries several studies illustrate the significance of direct and indirect social reproduction for lifestyle differentiation. Both under the communist regimes and in the years after the transitions, socioeconomic origin (measured through parental educational attainment or occupational status position) seems to be predictive for cultural participation as well as for material consumption.

Parental Political Resources and Lifestyle Differentiation:

Political Transmission

The explanatory value of parental socioeconomic background features for cultural and material lifestyle differences is remarkable. Especially in Eastern Europe, the Marxist regimes planned to establish a more egalitarian society. In doing so, governmental policy attempted to diminish the strength of the relation between life chances and social background. Thereby, the Marxist administrators took into account that the allocation of scarce goods does involve the transmission of benefits between consecutive generations. For that reason, socialist policymakers put controlling these patterns of social mobility and social reproduction prominent on their agenda. Specifically, influencing the intergenerational transmission of resources within families was a main goal of their de-stratification politics. In this respect, the abolition of large-scale private ownership and right to inherit private property are telling examples. These initiatives to reduce social reproduction went far beyond the policies of redistribution common in social-democratic western societies since the 1960s.

Nevertheless, empirical research suggests that the socialist de-stratification experiments have hardly accomplished their goals, particularly with respect to lifestyle differentiation. Findings on consumption patterns and cultural participation in Eastern Europe do not signify de-stratification across the board, as was observed some time ago (Lane, 1971, 1982; Connor, 1979). Inequalities in the access to cultural and material goods continue to resemble the structure of opportunities in the Western capitalist countries; i.e., (parental) socioeconomic background determines an individual's lifestyle quite strongly. Moreover, there seems to have been not much of a change in this respect, even over an extended period of several decades (Simkus and Andorka, 1982; Heyns and Bialeski, 1990; Robert, 1991).

Different explanations have been suggested for the apparent failure of the egalitarian socialist ideology or the reversal into a contradiction of its fundamental tenets. A plausible explanation of why egalitarian policies in the socialist countries did not live up to expectations might be that new forms of social inequality emerged. In this light several New Class theses have been proposed. In New Class theory it is postulated that in socialist societies the traditional set of opposing classes (owners vs nonowners) changed; a new set of conflicting opponents emerged. The best known exponent of New Class theory is found in Djilas (1957). More specifically, Djilas' New Class thesis assumes that under socialism political resources replaced the traditional social and cultural determi-

nants of social stratification relevant under capitalism. It is postulated that the ruling political elite constituted a status group, having its own methods and devices to establish social inequality. Inequality in socialist nations is accomplished through directly discriminating against the nonelite and through exercising control over indirect channels of social mobility. Subsequently, based on New Class theory, we expect that in Eastern Europe the political elite was successful in gaining access to the scarce supplies of high culture and luxury goods.

Indeed, some notable studies underscore that the elite from the Communist parties had superior opportunities to guarantee profitable conditions both for themselves and their offspring (Konrad and Szelényi, 1979; Connor, 1979). Party membership is shown to be beneficial in terms of income, occupational position, housing, children's education, luxury goods, and cultural privileges (Machonin, 1970; Böröcz and Southworth, 1984; Ganzeboom and Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Robert and Sagi, 1996). So, we presume that parental political resources in former Eastern Europe play an indispensable role in explaining lifestyle differentiation both directly and indirectly through the obtainment of advantageous social positions (see Fig. 1). If the effectiveness of political resources in explaining lifestyle differentiation could be established after the collapse of communism, this claim would be even more profound.

Parental Cultural Resources and Lifestyle Differentiation: Cultural Transmission

In Djilas (1957) the New Class is associated with a proletarian vanguard that entrenched its position inside the state bureaucracy. Two decades later, Gouldner (1979) and Konrad and Szelényi (1979) argued that the leading elites in state socialist societies were not proletarian at all, but more of an intellectual breed. These scholars emphasize that educational attainment and cultural competencies play a pivotal role in the processes of distribution and reproduction under state socialism. Because of the limited options for direct social reproduction in socialist Eastern Europe, cultural reproduction operates as a major alternative route for the transmission of inequalities.

The insight that cultural resources replaced former expressions of social inequality and constitute an indispensable element of inequality had already existed for a long time in Eastern European stratification research. It is assumed that individuals under circumstances that prevent them from directly transmitting material wealth to their offspring, as in socialist Eastern Europe, will tend to focus on strategies that emphasize cultural resources. Those who can successfully transfer cultural resources will be best off in the distribution of cultural and material goods. Early evidence in favor of cultural reproduction was found by Wesolowski and Slomczynski (1968) in Poland and by Machonin (1969, 1970) in Czechoslovakia. Since then, several Eastern European stratification researchers (e.g., Kolosi and Wnuk-Lipinski, 1983; Robert, 1984, 1989) have gained support for the cultural resources hypothesis.

If indeed this is true, the cultural resources thesis is in accordance with the ideas

of Bourdieu and Passeron (1970) and DiMaggio (1982). They argue that cultural factors constitute an alternative pathway for the transmission of social inequality. According to these authors, a specific cultural environment at home makes for inequality. More specifically, children from high-status backgrounds are exposed to high cultural values and activities at home and thus acquire cultural capital. These cultural resources are an asset in life because they enhance a person's capacities to master academic material and develop a taste for learning abstract and intellectual concepts. Subsequently, persons from high cultural backgrounds are more likely to reach higher levels of education (DiMaggio, 1982; DeGraaf, 1986; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp, 1996). Furthermore, a culturally favorable home climate is directly linked to lifestyle differences as well. As Mohr and DiMaggio (1995) illustrate, features of the cultural milieu at home are largely responsible for the accumulation of cultural interest and competence. As a consequence, individuals raised in visually or musically sophisticated families are highly likely to prefer high culture themselves. Additionally, a cultural socialization enhances an individual's life chances in general; simply, it teaches a high-status-group way of living. Thus, cultural reproduction with respect to noncultural lifestyle expressions is also expected. Individuals who experienced a favorable cultural home climate have accumulated cultural resources and therefore will be more apt to acquire material wealth.

Previous research has made this reasoning about cultural reproduction likely. Some studies conducted in western countries have underscored the importance of cultural capital for differentiation in lifestyle patterns. Mohr and DiMaggio (1995) have found significant positive effects of cultural capital in the United States and DeGraaf and DeGraaf (1988) in The Netherlands. In addition, Ganzeboom et al. (1990) observed an impressive correlation in Hungary. Even after relevant individual resources were taken into account, a significant positive effect of parental cultural capital on a person's cultural participation remained, illustrating the intergenerational transmission of cultural interest. In the socialist countries of Eastern Europe cultural reproduction is expected to be a relevant aspect of intergenerational transmission, much more so than in Western nations, because opportunities for direct social reproduction are limited. Hence, it is hypothesized that cultural reproduction takes place directly, but also indirectly, through occupying higher social positions than those without cultural capital (see Fig. 1).

Five Eastern European Countries: Different Contexts

Undoubtedly, when examining intergenerational transmission processes the countries of Eastern Europe will differ from the Western countries. Until the late 1980s Eastern European societies were under the control of communist regimes which aimed to hinder the traditional routes for transmission of resources. So, people in Eastern European countries, when trying to transfer advantages to their children, were expected to have applied alternative routes; for example, those of

cultural and political reproduction. Much more so, at least, than in Western nations.

However, also among the Eastern European nations, differences are expected. For decades, all the governments in Eastern Europe had to subscribe to the dominant Soviet ideology. In the Soviet Union, progress toward socialism was equated with the steady expansion of a planned urban-industrial economy under the guidance of professional administrators and communist party coordinators (Skocpol, 1986). This planeconomic model was implemented in the satellite socialist states of Eastern Europe as well. Nevertheless, the real practices varied across nations. The role of the Communist party, the privileges of rank-and-file members, the destratification policies, and the applied legacy regulations were different among the countries.

Czechoslovakia, for example, is generally seen as one of the most harsh and conservative socialist systems (Gitelman, 1986). The country has been under strong orthodox communist rule for a long time, particularly since the events in Prague in 1968. Under this rule, particularly class discrimination in higher education was strong. Furthermore, the role of the elite party was already dominant since the beginning of the state socialist period. Almost the same is true for Bulgaria. The Bulgarian economy resembled a smaller version of the Soviet economy of the time. State-controlled institutions were the main source of initiatives and the allocation of labor (Lampe, 1986). Furthermore, the political arena in Bulgaria lacked pluralism and communist control affected almost all areas of daily life (Lampe, 1986).

In comparison, Hungary experienced only a short period of communist orthodoxy, in the early 1950s, and is generally seen as one of the most liberal socialist countries. Especially after 1956, i.e., the Kadar period, the country was liberalized considerably, both economically and politically. For example, after the 1956 crisis social classes were no longer restricted in their admission to higher education. Furthermore, after 1956 the Communist party lost most of its old members, which led to a complete renewal of the party in the decade that followed (Gitelman, 1986). Poland can be described as liberal socialist as well. Its history under communism involves a large number of collective protests by various social and professional groups. Moreover, Poland was the first Soviet-bloc country in which the communists peacefully surrendered power in 1989. Although Communist party members and intellectuals in Poland had better living standards, freedoms, and opportunities than other social groups, the party grip on economic and social life was relatively modest compared to the situation in other Eastern European countries (Staar, 1998).

Indeed, the five Eastern European countries are quite disparate. Based on the general history, the strictness of the regimes, and the role of the Communist parties, we expect that in Hungary and Poland the role of parental cultural and political resources was less pronounced than in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, but was, however, still more pronounced than in most Western countries.

DATA, METHOD, AND MEASUREMENT

The SSEE Data

To test our expectations with respect to lifestyle differentiation in Eastern Europe, we analyzed data from five large-scale surveys held in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in 1993. The surveys were organized within the project "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989" (SSEE), supervised by Donald Treiman and Ivan Szélenyi from UCLA in conjunction with researchers from the countries surveyed (Treiman and Szélenyi, 1993). In all five countries, the SSEE data refer to a national random probability sample of the population. Moreover, since exactly the same questions are asked in all five countries and similar sample designs are used, the data are highly comparable cross-nationally. The SSEE data enable us to include Bulgaria in this study, a country we know little about with respect to lifestyle differentiation. In order to avoid misspecification, we limit our analyses to adult men and women between 25 and 70 years of age, with valid information on all of the relevant variables. This leaves us with a total of 3542 respondents in Bulgaria (22.1% excluded), 4662 in the Czech Republic (9.7% excluded), 3339 in Hungary (11.5% excluded), 2635 in Poland (13.5% excluded), and 3777 in Slovakia (15.0% excluded). Most of the loss of information is due to the age selection. There is no reason to believe that the applied method of listwise exclusion of missing data altered the results of the analyses.

The SSEE data go far beyond the usual stratification and lifestyle surveys in several ways. First, their quality lies in the fact that the SSEE data contain explicit measurements of the relevant theoretical concepts, for the respondents as well as for their parents. In particular, the cultural environment in the parental home during childhood (around age 14) is extensively measured. Moreover, the information on parental cultural capital is highly comparable with information on the respondents' cultural behavior at the time of the survey. Second, the SSEE data are not only comparable between generations, but also between nations. In all five Eastern European countries, questions were asked in the same fashion. Earlier cross-national lifestyle research often does not make clear whether the variation between countries is due to real differentiation or to contrasting measurements. The SSEE data, however, make it possible to do replicated tests for the five Eastern European countries. This five-country design provides stronger evidence on the tenability of the explanatory mechanisms than does a single-country design.

Although the SSEE data are unique in providing information on the questions at hand in this article, one drawback, however, is the lack of information on the financial and material assets of the parents. Due to this limitation, the direct transmission of material resources cannot be investigated. Although parental financial resources will be important in predicting educational and occupational attainment, the study by Ganzeboom et al. (1990) on Hungary indicates that the direct transmission of material assets is rather limited. Therefore, we assume that

the estimates of the effects of parental characteristics on material consumption and high-culture participation are hardly biased by the lack of this information.

Dependent Variables: High-Culture Participation and Material Consumption

In line with Bourdieu (1984), we assume that cultural and material lifestyle differentiation can be described by looking at high-culture participation and at the possession of luxurious consumer durables. To measure *high-culture participation* respondents are asked how often they went to museums and plays and listened to classical music at home. In addition to these activities, high-culture participation is believed to be related to two aspects of reading, namely the number of serious (literature/science) books read and the number of times a person goes to a public library.¹ All five indicators of high-culture participation apply six answer categories, ranging from never to more than once a week. For reasons of presentation, we recode the six categories in terms of a year score, resulting in an ordinal scale, ranging from 0 to 52 times a year.²

Next, *material consumption* is indicated by the ownership of eight consumer durables (coded 0/1): washing machine, VCR, satellite dish, microwave, freezer, computer, lavatory, and bathroom. Furthermore, housing quality is measured by the number of rooms and the size (in square meters) of a respondent's house. Of course the pertinent goods are probably partly purchased by respondents or their families before the year of survey. Some even might have been purchased before 1989, when the Eastern European countries were under socialist regime. Nevertheless, these items provide sufficient indication for a person's material wealth at the time of the interview.³

In Appendix 1A, we display the mean and standard deviation for the various indicators. On average, the figures reveal a striking similarity among the Eastern European nations; at the same time variation on the two lifestyle domains is also observed. In the case of high-culture participation, the Czech and Slovakian people most often went to theaters, museums, and public libraries, especially compared with Poles and Bulgarians. The Czechs went to a theater 2.23 times a year and 3.93 times to a library. In contrast, Poles went to plays only 1.21 times and to a library 2.47 times a year. The Czechs were the most avid readers as well; they read approximately 15 books a year, while the Hungarians and Poles read no

¹ Reading is an important aspect of high culture, and using libraries—especially in less wealthy countries—plays an essential role in reading. Therefore, in contrast to some research in Western countries, using libraries in Eastern Europe is included in measuring cultural participation (Treiman and Szelenyi, 1993).

² For all five indicators of high-culture participation a ranking of 0 refers to never, 1 refer to less than once a year, 2 refers to once or twice a year, 6 refers to a few times a year, 12 refers to around once a month, 26 refers to several times monthly/once a week, and 52 refers to more often than once a week.

³ The effects of parental background established in our analyses are the result of processes that occurred before 1989 (under socialism) and processes that shaped life chances between 1989 and 1993 (after socialism). Since parental cultural and political resources are presumed to be particularly helpful under communism, the effects in our analyses probably are underestimated with respect to the situation before 1989.

more than an average of 10 books. In general, however, we observe more similarities than contrasts among the countries with respect to high culture.

Of the five Eastern European countries, clearly the Bulgarians have the lowest standard of living with respect to material consumption. Only 35% of the Bulgarians possesses a washing machine, as compared to more than 60% of the Poles and Czechs. And only 6% of Bulgarians own a freezer. In contrast, in Hungary and the Czech Republic more than 60% of the people own a freezer. Moreover, homes in Poland on average are the smallest, in size as well as with respect to the number of rooms.

In this study we are not primarily interested in differences between separate lifestyle indicators. Our main concern lies with the explanatory potential of the three reproduction mechanisms for the differentiation in high-culture participation and material consumption. Therefore, to create an index for cultural participation and material wealth, we calculated the average of the unweighted standardized scores on the indicators. The reliability coefficients of the resulting scales are reported in Appendix 2. In general, the reliability is not extremely high (all but one over $\alpha = .60$), but it is satisfactory for a scaling procedure in which items represent a broad range of topics. Since our aim is to explain the variations in lifestyle within each nation, we constructed scales for the five Eastern European countries separately. Moreover, since we are interested in cultural behavior and material wealth as positional goods, it is important to study them relative to other people's cultural behavior and material wealth. In other words, a person's lifestyle needs to be measured by comparing it with lifestyle choices of inhabitants of the same country. Instead of using the raw average scores of the scales as dependent variables we therefore computed percentile scores; respondents are ranked on the basis of their score on the scale for cultural participation and material consumption, and each respondent is given a related percentile score. The resulting scales then range from 0 to 100, with a mean in each nation of 50 (see Appendix 1A). Subsequently, a position of 35 on a high-culture participation scale means that 35% of a country's population is less culturally active and 65% is more culturally active.

Independent Variables: Individual Characteristics and Parental Background Resources

The main question in our study concerns to what extent individual characteristics and social, political, and cultural resources associated with a person's parental background affect lifestyle differentiation on the cultural and material domain. Several indicators of these concepts are used in our analyses as explanatory variables. Descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Appendix 1B. Individual characteristics are measured by *educational attainment* (in years of schooling), *monthly (household) income per capita* (percentile scores), *occupational prestige* [current or last occupation in prestige points (Treiman, 1977)], and *former affiliation to the Communist party*. In line with earlier research and official statistics, the general level of schooling is highest in the Czech Republic (11.9

years) and Slovakia (11.8 years) and lowest in Bulgaria (9.7 years). For occupational prestige, we observe a similar pattern. With respect to Party membership in all the countries, between 10 and 16% of our respondents were once affiliated to a Communist party.⁴ Income is perceived as a positional good and thus measured with percentile scores for each country separately.

Parental socioeconomic resources are indicated by *parental educational attainment* (mean of father's and mother's education in years of schooling) and *parental occupational prestige* (average score of father's and mother's occupational prestige when the respondent was 14). As expected, given the results at the respondent level, the average educational level of the parents is the lowest in Bulgaria (5.33 years) and the highest in the Czech Republic (9.57 years). With respect to occupational prestige, a counterintuitive pattern is revealed; in Bulgaria the average prestige score for the parents is the highest. This outcome is caused by an the high number of Bulgarian parents working in the agricultural sector, probably because of fairly late industrialization.⁵

The political resources of a respondent's parents are measured through the *former affiliation to the Communist party* of at least one parent. In the case of parental party affiliation, cross-national differences are observed as well; in the Czech Republic no fewer than 28% of the families reported that a parent had once been a member of the Communist party. In the other Eastern European countries, parental affiliation with the Communist party fluctuates between 15 and 18%.

To measure *parental cultural resources*, retrospective questions are asked in exactly the same fashion as the questions on high-culture participation. These measures refer to parental cultural behavior and reading activities during the period when respondents were growing up, i.e., around 14 years of age. Thus, with respect to parental cultural capital, the respondents are asked how often their parents went to museums, how often they went to plays, how often they listened to classical music at home, how many serious (literature/science) books they read, and how often they went to a public library. Again, these indicators have six answering categories, ranging from never to more than once a week and are rearranged in terms of a year score. Descriptions of these indicators are presented in Appendix 1B. A comparison of the means clearly shows that the Czech parents are the most culturally active, in contrast with Polish and Bulgarian parents, who show the least cultural interest. Using the same procedure as for the respondents, scales for parental cultural capital are constructed by calculating the average of the unweighted standardized scores for the subsequent indicators (in all countries

⁴ It is difficult to judge if respondents provided reliable reports on their own and their parents' party affiliation. However, the number of respondents who reported being a member of a Communist party in 1993 is in accordance with official statistics. We therefore are confident that information on party membership before 1989 is also accurate.

⁵ To check for an overrepresentation of agricultural labor, we assigned a lower score (21; the average of unskilled workers) to agricultural workers (originally given a prestige score of 40 in the SSEE survey) in all the countries. This correction did not alter the results of the regression analyses. We therefore chose to use the original coding of the SSEE data.

the reliability coefficients are above $\alpha = .65$). Again, for each parental home the relative position with respect to cultural resources, measured by a percentile score, is computed. A score of 60 on the parental cultural resources scale indicates that 60% of the parents in a particular country were less culturally active and 40% of the parents were more culturally active.

Although the impact of individual resources and parental characteristics is the main concern, we also take relevant demographic background features into account. To begin with, a person's position in the life cycle is assumed to be relevant, since these differences could cause specific financial and time/budget restrictions. Therefore, we include *age* (in years), *marital status* (0/1: married or living together is coded 1), and *employment situation* (0/1: employed full-time is coded 1). Next, we control for *gender* (0/1: female is coded 1). We also account for children in the respondent's home who needed parenting. A separation is made for *children under the age of 6* (total number) and *children over the age of 6* (total number). Finally, in Eastern Europe the *degree of urbanization* of a person's residence is considered relevant. Especially in the case of high culture, but of material wealth as well, variations in consumption patterns can be due to supply-side features. This is because rural regions generally have fewer cultural and material provisions than urban areas. Urbanization is measured in five categories, ranging from rural area (1) to capital city (5).

EXPLAINING DIFFERENTIATION IN LIFESTYLE

Bivariate Analyses

In this section, we describe how differences in high-culture participation and material wealth are related to individual features and the three resources from the parental background. By doing so, we give a preliminary answer to the main research question. In Table 1, the mean percentile scores for the two lifestyle domains are cross-tabulated with the measures of the explanatory concepts. All the independent variables are rearranged in such a way that, if possible, the distinguished categories refer to about a third of the research population. Mean percentile scores for high-culture participation and material consumption then show the differentiation based on these independent features. Percentile scores, by definition, range from 0 to 100, with a mean of 50. So, if there is no association between an independent variable and, for example, material consumption a mean percentile score of 50 is expected for each category of the independent variable. Contrarily, if an association does exist the mean percentile scores are more dispersed over the range between 0 and 100.⁶

Table 1 reveals indisputable social differentiation in Eastern European life-

⁶ The distribution depends on the association between dependent and independent variables and the number of respondents in a category. If, as is the case for income, an equal number of respondents is located in each category, no association is represented by a mean score of 50 in each tertile. For income an association of 1 is represented by a percentile score of 16.66 in the first tertile, 50 in the second, and 83.33 in the third tertile.

TABLE 1
Mean Values of High-Culture Participation and Material Consumption by Individual Characteristics and Parental Background Features in Five Eastern European Countries in 1993^a

Variables (range)	Bulgaria		Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Slovakia	
	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c
Individual characteristics										
Educational attainment (years)										
0 to 8 years	34	38	39	32	33	34	30	35	35	30
9 to 13 years	59	58	47	50	52	53	50	52	48	51
14+ years	78	68	66	59	74	69	73	62	66	63
Income (percentiles)										
Lowest tertile	42	41	48	37	40	35	42	37	47	37
Middle tertile	49	48	49	53	49	51	49	49	47	50
Highest tertile	59	61	53	61	61	65	59	63	56	63
Occupational prestige (0–100)										
0 to 30 points	44	45	44	42	38	36	43	41	40	39
30 to 40 points	43	44	43	49	45	49	41	46	44	46
40 to 100 points	67	64	60	56	65	62	65	59	60	59
Affiliation with Communist party										
Not a member	48	48	49	50	49	49	49	49	49	49
Member	62	61	55	51	61	58	55	54	54	57
Parental socioeconomic resources										
Parental educational attainment (years)										
0 to 8 years	45	46	46	42	43	45	43	46	44	44
9 to 13 years	72	67	51	53	62	60	61	58	56	56
14+ years	82	72	68	60	82	72	76	67	66	68
Parental occupational prestige (0–100)										
0 to 30 points	47	46	47	42	42	43	48	45	45	45
30 to 40 points	46	47	47	49	47	48	46	48	47	48
40 to 100 points	69	64	57	56	65	62	63	61	59	58
Parental political resources										
Parental affiliation with Communist party										
Not a member	47	48	49	49	48	49	48	48	49	49
Member	66	61	52	53	61	57	59	57	56	57
Parental cultural resources										
Parental cultural capital (percentiles)										
None	37	43	32	43	35	41	37	43	34	41
0 to 80%	60	58	48	50	57	55	58	54	51	52
80 to 100%	79	66	71	55	74	61	72	61	71	58
Total number of respondents	3542		4662		3339		2635		3777	

^a Source: Treiman and Szelenyi (1993).

^b Mean values for high-culture participation.

^c Mean values for material consumption.

styles among the categories of the selected independent features. Yet in all five countries the patterns of lifestyle differentiation are surprisingly alike. In particular, with respect to parental socioeconomic background, there are relevant differences in the positioning on the high-culture and material consumption ladder. Parental educational attainment especially seems meaningful. For example, in Hungary, respondents with well-educated parents (having on the average more than 14 years of schooling) exhibit a high-culture participation

score of 82. This implies that, on average, 82% of the Hungarians score lower in the cultural field than respondents with highly educated parents. For the other Eastern European nations similar yet less striking results are found. On the material domain, parental education proves to be important as well. Additionally, variation in parental occupational prestige predominantly pertains to differences between people whose parents hold a prestige value higher than 40 points and those whose parents hold a value less than 40 points.

Parental political resources are likely to be relevant in Eastern Europe. In line with the ideas of Djilas (1957), affiliation of one's parents to the communist party should pay off in terms of a substantially higher position on the cultural as well as the material lifestyle ladder. In Bulgaria and Hungary, the effects are particularly striking. Respondents of parents who once were a member of the Communist party reveal an average percentile score of around 60, both on the cultural and the material field, whereas children from nonparty affiliates stay close to the mean percentile score of 50.

Parental cultural resources mainly appear relevant in the cultural field. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, for instance, respondents with parents active in high culture (80 to 100%) reveal a mean score of 71 on the high-culture participation scale.⁷ Perhaps more surprising is the fact that a respondent's position on the material domain is related to cultural socialization as well. For the moment it seems as if culturally active parents provide their children with better resources to do well materially than parents who were not active culturally.

As indicated, probably most of the effects of parental background run through a person's individual characteristics. That individual features are important is illustrated in Table 1 as well. For high-culture participation, the effects of the individual resources are most clear. Bulgarians with less than 9 years of education show a mean percentile score of 34 on the high-culture participation scale, whereas Bulgarian respondents with more than 14 years of education display a mean score of 78. In all five countries variation in income is especially relevant to material consumption. The impact of occupational prestige is also comparable among the Eastern European countries; individuals with prestigious occupations (over 40 points) differ from less respected workers on the cultural and material domain. Former Communist party membership reveals substantial variation. Particularly in Bulgaria and Hungary, affiliation pays off in terms of more cultural participation and material luxury.

⁷ It could be argued that parental cultural capital is a strong predictor of cultural differentiation because of the misperceptions of respondents with respect to their parents' cultural practices. Respondents who do not really know their parents' cultural practices very well might be inclined to report practices that are more similar to their own current practices. We checked this using data from a national representative study held in The Netherlands (Ultee and Ganzeboom, 1993). In that study parents and their children separately were asked to provide information on parental cultural lifestyle when the respondent was age 14. In an OLS regression of parental cultural lifestyle (as reported by the parents) on the respondents' lifestyle and the parental lifestyle (as reported by the respondent) it was found that the respondents' own cultural lifestyle has no significant effect, indicating that respondents' reports of parental lifestyle are hardly biased in the direction of their own cultural practices.

To conclude, these findings reveal remarkably equal patterns of social and cultural transmission in all five Eastern European countries. Political reproduction, however, mainly takes place in Bulgaria and Hungary. The descriptive analyses reported here pertain to bivariate associations without controlling relevant aspects and without examining the paths and mechanisms of intergenerational transmission. We turn to this issue in the next section.

Multivariate Analyses: Direct Effect of Parental Background and Individual Features

In all five countries, previous socialist ideology generated implementation of egalitarian policies. Serious effects were implemented to diminish the opportunities for parents to transmit advantageous conditions onto their offspring. As a result it can be expected that in particular the direct influences of parental background resources on various life chances in Eastern Europe are minimalized. In this section we, therefore, address the question on the direct intergenerational transmission of lifestyle inequality.

To gain detailed insight into the relative weight of the factors that determine the differentiation in lifestyle in Eastern Europe, we present ordinary least-squares (OLS) coefficients of individual features and parental background characteristics separately for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The coefficients we report on are the standardized (β) and unstandardized effects (b) of several independent factors for high-culture participation and material consumption (direct arrows on lifestyle in Fig. 1). Standardized regression coefficients indicate the relative strength of the explanatory variables predicting differences in cultural participation and material wealth, and unstandardized coefficients signify specific changes in the relative position of an individual, on a 0-to-100 ranking of a certain lifestyle domain in a country.

Differentiation in high-culture participation. From Table 2 it is clear that direct social reproduction in Eastern Europe is only modest. The socioeconomic ranking of a person's parents is of only minor importance in predicting participation in high culture latter in life. Only in Bulgaria is parental educational attainment significantly related to cultural participation. Thus, it can be concluded that direct transmission of social inequality through parental socioeconomic background in Eastern Europe is practically nonexistent. Whether this leads to the conclusion that socialist destratification measures have been successful in diminishing the intergenerational transmission of inequality remains to be seen. Yet, research of cultural participation in Western countries shows modest but significant effects of parental socioeconomic resources when individual aspects and cultural resources are controlled for (Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp, 1989; Niehof, 1997).

Another interesting result pertains to the transmission of political resources in Bulgaria. Although the direct effect is modest, formerly communist parents significantly enhanced their children's position in the cultural domain; respondents whose parents once were members of the party score 2.3 percentage points higher on cultural participation. In the other Eastern European nations political re-

TABLE 2A
 Regression [Unstandardized (*b*) and Standardized (β) Coefficients] of High-Culture Participation on Individual Characteristics
 and Parental Resources for Five Eastern European Countries in 1993^a

Variables (range)	High-culture participation									
	Bulgaria		Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Slovakia	
	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)
Demographic background										
Woman	1.663 (.675)	.029*	8.827 (.751)	.153***	6.001 (.765)	.105***	5.578 (.867)	.098***	8.032 (.825)	.139***
Age (25 = 0)	-.163 (.113)	.072	-.440 (.127)	.188**	-.055 (.128)	.024	-.034 (.155)	-.014	-.173 (.144)	.071
Age ²	-.003 (.002)	-.068	-.003 (.003)	-.055	-.001 (.003)	-.003	.003 (.004)	.062	-.001 (.003)	-.013
Degree of urbanization (1 = 0)	2.340 (.269)	.117***	1.040 (.275)	.049**	1.934 (.281)	.098***	2.305 (.352)	.109***	1.009 (.322)	.045**
Married	-.350 (.982)	-.005	-2.465 (1.079)	-.034*	-3.480 (1.103)	-.049**	-.869 (1.221)	-.012	-2.522 (1.166)	-.036*
Employed full-time	1.926 (.790)	.033*	-2.804 (.995)	-.046**	-.283 (.903)	-.005	1.957 (1.012)	.033	1.275 (.957)	.022
No. of children under 6 years old	-1.525 (.725)	-.028*	-3.830 (.908)	-.060***	-3.476 (.871)	-.059***	-2.120 (.697)	-.050**	-3.167 (.880)	-.057**
No. of children over 6 years old	-1.015 (.404)	-.034*	-.561 (.414)	-.020	-.672 (.446)	-.023	-.665 (.427)	-.026	-.975 (.410)	-.038*
Individual characteristics										
Educational attainment (12 = 0)	2.268 (.140)	.282***	2.098 (.167)	.210***	2.155 (.163)	.263***	2.912 (.178)	.348***	1.772 (.172)	.200***
Income (50 = 0)	.025 (.014)	.026	-.019 (.017)	.019	.104 (.018)	.105***	.026 (.019)	.026	.044 (.018)	.044*
Occupational prestige (40 = 0)	.082 (.029)	.039**	-.211 (.036)	.089***	.193 (.037)	.085***	.187 (.043)	.077***	.204 (.040)	.089***
Affiliation with Communist party	4.072 (.996)	.051***	1.591 (1.079)	.020	2.326 (1.226)	.026	2.245 (1.340)	.026	2.823 (1.132)	.036*
Parental socioeconomic resources										
Parental educational attainment (12 = 0)	.680 (.125)	.096***	-.259 (.236)	-.018	.403 (.180)	.042*	.304 (.176)	.035	-.503 (.244)	-.039*
Parental occupational prestige (40 = 0)	-.095 (.035)	-.035**	-.098 (.036)	-.039**	-.036 (.035)	-.015	-.057 (.044)	-.021	-.051 (.039)	-.021
Parental political resources										
Parental affiliation with Communist party	2.272 (.935)	.031*	-.984 (.812)	-.015	2.030 (1.058)	.026	.281 (1.140)	.004	-.826 (1.078)	-.011
Parental cultural resources										
Parental cultural capital (50 = 0)	.388 (.017)	.346***	.415 (.014)	.414***	.347 (.0172)	.331***	.318 (.018)	.299***	.419 (.016)	.415***
Constant	53.165 (1.74)		40.522 (1.92)		50.901 (1.84)		46.929 (2.08)		42.814 (1.94)	
Adjusted R ² (percentage)	51.3%		32.5%		45.4%		44.3%		31.6%	
Total number of respondents	3542		4662		3339		2635		3777	

^a Source: Treiman and Szelenyi (1993).

* Significant at $p < .05$.

** Significant at $p < .01$.

*** Significant at $p < .001$.

TABLE 2B
Regression [Unstandardized (*b*) and Standardized (β) Coefficients] of Material Consumption on Individual Characteristics
and Parental Resources for Five Eastern European Countries in 1993^a

Variables (range)	Material consumption													
	Bulgaria			Czech Republic			Hungary			Poland			Slovakia	
	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)	<i>b</i> (SE)	β (sig)
Demographic background														
Woman	.206 (.834)	.004	.499 (.806)	.009	2.927 (.835)	.051***	1.231 (1.008)	.021	1.862 (.858)	.032*				
Age (25 = 0)	-.445 (1.140)	.192**	-.293 (1.137)	.125*	.383 (1.140)	.164***	.173 (1.180)	.072	-.362 (1.150)	.150*				
Age ²	-.008 (.003)	-.154*	-.013 (.003)	-.013***	-.008 (.003)	-.157*	-.008 (.004)	-.146*	-.011 (.003)	-.206**				
Degree of urbanization (1 = 0)	3.212 (3.333)	.157***	-1.913 (.296)	-.090***	-1.131 (.307)	-.007	5.907 (4.110)	.042*	-1.010 (.335)	-.045**				
Married	6.756 (1.214)	.088***	9.213 (1.157)	.125***	8.597 (1.205)	.119***	5.907 (1.420)	.082***	7.554 (1.212)	.109***				
Employed full-time	.741 (.977)	.013	2.687 (1.067)	.045*	5.638 (.987)	.097***	.544 (1.177)	.009	3.465 (.996)	.057**				
No. of children under 6 years old	1.054 (.896)	.019	-.541 (.974)	-.009	-.630 (.952)	-.011	-.038 (.811)	-.001	-1.566 (.916)	-.028				
No. of children over 6 years old	2.739 (.500)	.090***	2.830 (.445)	.099***	3.172 (.487)	.107***	3.093 (.497)	.122***	2.216 (.426)	.087***				
Individual characteristics														
Educational attainment (12 = 0)	1.441 (.173)	.176***	.837 (.179)	.084***	1.635 (.178)	.198***	1.048 (.207)	.124***	1.139 (.179)	.129***				
Income (50 = 0)	.088 (.018)	.088***	.146 (.018)	.146***	.184 (.019)	.184***	.242 (.022)	.242***	.185 (.019)	.185***				
Occupational prestige (40 = 0)	.059 (.036)	.027	-.159 (.039)	-.067***	.179 (.041)	.078***	-.135 (.050)	-.055**	.233 (.041)	.102***				
Affiliation with Communist party	4.028 (1.231)	.050**	-1.677 (1.075)	-.022	1.909 (1.340)	.021	920 (1.559)	.011	2.836 (1.177)	.036*				
Parental socioeconomic resources														
Parental educational attainment (12 = 0)	1.121 (1.154)	.155***	.913 (.253)	.062**	1.229 (.196)	.126***	.672 (.205)	.077**	1.254 (.253)	.097***				
Parental occupational prestige (40 = 0)	.032 (.043)	.011	.079 (.039)	.031*	.028 (.039)	.012	.058 (.051)	.021	.015 (.041)	.006				
Parental political resources														
Parental affiliation with Communist party	1.077 (1.156)	.014	-1.837 (.871)	-.028*	.223 (1.156)	.003	1.261 (1.326)	.017	.423 (1.121)	.006				
Parental cultural resources														
Parental cultural capital (50 = 0)	.094 (.021)	.083***	.038 (.014)	.038***	.041 (.019)	.039*	.067 (.022)	.062**	.051 (.017)	.050**				
Constant	41.604 (2.115)		45.993 (2.06)		40.822 (2.01)		43.881 (2.42)		42.585 (2.01)					
Adjusted R ² (percentage)	28.3%		22.3%		35.7%		26.3%		26.0%					
Total number of respondents	3542		4662		3339		2635		3777					

^a Source: Treiman and Szelenyi (1993).
* Significant at $p < .05$.
** Significant at $p < .01$.
*** Significant at $p < .001$.

production does not occur in a direct fashion, which makes the claims of New Class theory less likely.

In predicting cultural behavior, parental cultural resources are found to be extremely important. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia parental cultural capital seems even more important than individual qualities. Our results illustrate the importance of cultural socialization for high-culture participation later in life; in all five countries the effects of parental cultural capital are highly significant. In general, a change of 10 percentage points of parental cultural capital results in a high-culture participation difference of 3.1 (in Poland) and 4.2 (in Slovakia). Thus, cultural transmission is relatively high.

Our results seem to clearly corroborate the idea that cultural capital is important in socialist Eastern Europe. Whether cultural transmission in Eastern Europe exceeds that in Western countries, however, is difficult to determine. Only a few studies address such questions. A study by DeGraaf and DeGraaf (1988) of The Netherlands illustrates that cultural transmission there is less substantial. Additionally, research by Niehof (1997) comparing The Netherlands, Australia, and the United States shows that cultural transmission is significantly lower (around $\beta = .30$). These studies provide some evidence that indeed in Eastern Europe cultural transmission is a more important (alternative) pathway for transmitting lifestyle inequalities than in Western countries. The fact that our data refer to 1993, a time after the collapse of socialism, makes this claim even stronger.

Individual features are meaningful in explaining differentiation in high-culture participation as well. It seems clear that education is the most meaningful aspect to consider. In all five countries, an extra year of school roughly leads to an increase of 2 percentage points on our cultural participation scale. The effects of education are most profound in Bulgaria and Poland. Apparently, in these countries, achievement is more important than ascriptive characteristics. Cultural participation is only marginally determined by financial restrictions. Significant effects of income on cultural behavior are detected only in Hungary and Slovakia. On the other hand, occupational prestige affects high-culture participation in the sense that people in more prestigious professions are more culturally active. These results do not differ from the results found in Western countries (Niehof, 1997), which indicates that redistribution of cultural goods in former socialist Eastern Europe does not differ substantially from that in capitalist countries.

Finally, a fascinating result is found for Communist party affiliation, especially in Bulgaria. There, former communists score 4 percentage points higher on the cultural participation scale than nonmembers. In Slovakia the difference is more modest (2.8), but still significant. These figures illustrate long-lasting effects of individual political resources in former socialist countries regarding cultural participation.

Differentiation in material consumption. To explain material wealth, parental socioeconomic resources are of somewhat more importance than in the case of cultural participation (see Table 2). In all five countries more highly educated parents succeed in directly transmitting advantageous to their offspring. So,

socialist destratification efforts have been apparently less successful in the material domain than in the cultural domain. Even more surprising is the fact that in Bulgaria (the most socialist country) and Hungary (the most liberalized socialist country) these effects are most pronounced. In evaluating social reproduction it must be said that no study is known to us in which parental socioeconomic resources in Western countries directly affect material wealth. Most studies show no significant social reproduction effects in Western societies when individual resources are controlled for (DeGraaf and DeGraaf, 1988; Kolosi, 1989).

Parental political resources do not directly improve the material position of an individual. In none of the countries under investigation did we find a significant effect related to communist party affiliation. So, direct political transmission did not occur. Instead, for material consumption cultural reproduction does take place, but to a lesser extent than for high-culture participation. Apparently, in all five Eastern European countries, parents who are culturally active directly provide their children with resources that enhance their material success. These results confirm the cultural reproduction idea.

As expected, the effects of individual resources on material consumption are pronounced. Next to income, educational attainment is a major factor generating differences in material wealth in all five countries. Surprisingly, in Bulgaria and Hungary, education is even more important than income; in these two countries, each year of schooling increases a person's material wealth by roughly 1.5%. Income is the most meaningful factor in predicting material consumption in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. There, for every 10-point shift in income a person gains around 2 percentage points on the material consumption ladder. In addition, people in prestigious occupations acquire more material wealth. A major exception in this respect is Bulgaria. In this country, occupational prestige does not account for accumulation on the material consumption ladder. It can be concluded that by no means did the redistribution measures of the former socialist governments affect individual differences. It seems that the former socialist countries do not differ from Western capitalist countries in this respect (Kolosi, 1989; Ganzeboom and Kraaykamp, 1989).

Surprisingly, former Communists party membership is important in predicting material wealth in Bulgaria and Slovakia. A person who once was in the Bulgarian Communist party improved his or her position on the material wealth scale by 4.0 percentage points. This is even more surprising when we keep in mind that our data pertain to 1993, 4 years after the major political changes in Eastern Europe. So, even years after the transformation former political resources pay off in terms of material assets.

Multivariate Analyses: Pathways of Intergenerational Reproduction

In the previous section, the direct transmission of inequality was studied. But as indicated before, reproduction does not occur only directly; transmission of inequality also takes place indirectly (see Fig. 1). To elaborate on this issue, in this section we investigate direct and indirect effects of social, political, and cultural transmission.

Table 3 displays the total effects of parental socioeconomic resources, political resources, and cultural resources on high-culture participation and material wealth. Total effects are calculated on the basis of estimates from a number of OLS regression equations as shown in Fig. 1. Table 3 also shows a breakdown of direct and indirect effects; direct effects are compared with total effects. For example, in Bulgaria the direct effect of parental education on high-culture participation ($\beta = .096$) accounts for 25.4% of the total effect ($\beta = .377$). In cases where direct and indirect effects oppose each other, no breakdown is conducted. Additionally, Table 3 indicates the extent to which indirect effects of parental socioeconomic resources and political resources operate through individual characteristics and parental cultural resources.

Parental background and high-culture participation. For the participation in high culture in Eastern Europe, the results of the breakdown largely confirm the expectations of the relevance of social, political, and cultural transmission.

Indeed, Table 3 shows that the two indicators of parental socioeconomic resources expose significant total effects for cultural participation. Parental educational attainment is particularly relevant in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland (total effect close to $\beta = .300$), but less relevant in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (total effect close to $\beta = .200$). The fact that, compared to education, parental occupational prestige is of minor importance indicates that high culture participation concerns more than purely social status transmission. Furthermore, the breakdown suggests that in the Eastern European countries parental socioeconomic resources affect an individual's high-culture interest indirectly. In most countries more than 75% of the total effect of parental education is indirect (and mostly via parental cultural resources). This result illustrates that socioeconomic parental resources mainly strengthen an individual's cultural position through alternative pathways.

Of particular interest in Eastern Europe are the total effects of the parental political resources, as indicated by former communist affiliation. Table 3 shows that for cultural participation these political resources are important mainly in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland (significant total effects), which supports the New Class theses. Again, most of the total effects could be assigned to indirect pathways of transmission; between 58% (in Hungary) and 90% (in Poland) appears to be indirect. Most of the indirect effects of parental political affiliation come from parents' cultural resources. Most likely, parents' membership in the Communist party led to easier access to cultural participation.

As expected, because the direct effects are substantive, the total effects of parental cultural resources on high-culture participation are impressive. The coefficients vary between $\beta = .371$ in Poland and $\beta = .457$ in Slovakia. In contrast to parental socioeconomic and political resources, cultural resources affect high-culture interest predominantly in a direct way; on average 85% of the total effect of parental cultural capital on cultural participation is direct. Consequently, it is concluded that in Eastern Europe the direct transmission of cultural interests from parents to their children determines the differentiation in the cultural domain to a fairly large extent.

TABLE 3
Decomposition of Total Effects of Social, Political, and Cultural Transmission on High-Culture Participation and Material Consumption in Five Eastern European Nations in 1993 (All Effects Controlled for Demographic Background Variables)^a

Variables	Bulgaria		Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Slovakia	
	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c	Cul. ^b	Mat. ^c
Social Transmission										
Total effect of parental educational attainment	.377***	.289***	.192***	.126***	.311***	.264***	.300***	.195***	.188***	.196***
Direct	25.4%	53.6%	— ^d	49.5%	13.1%	47.5%	11.8%	39.6%	— ^d	49.4%
Indirect (total)	74.6%	46.4%	— ^d	50.5%	86.9%	52.5%	88.2%	60.4%	— ^d	50.6%
Via individual characteristics	42.5%	63.1%	34.1%	70.2%	38.1%	68.2%	39.3%	60.2%	30.6%	67.4%
Via cultural reproduction	57.5%	36.9%	65.9%	29.8%	61.9%	31.8%	60.7%	39.8%	69.4%	32.6%
Total effect of parental occupational prestige	.015	.032	.055***	.060***	.052***	.047***	.041*	.054***	.062***	.047***
Direct	— ^d	35.7%	— ^d	52.1%	— ^d	25.0%	— ^d	38.4%	— ^d	12.9%
Indirect (total)	— ^d	64.3%	— ^d	47.9%	— ^d	75.0%	— ^d	61.6%	— ^d	87.1%
Via individual characteristics	22.5%	42.8%	39.5%	72.6%	40.4%	69.8%	48.0%	71.8%	42.0%	75.9%
Via cultural reproduction	77.5%	57.2%	60.5%	27.4%	59.6%	30.2%	52.0%	28.2%	58.0%	24.1%
Political Transmission										
Total effect of parental affiliation communist party	.089***	.048***	.013	-.024	.055***	.013	.039*	.035	.028	.030***
Direct	34.5%	29.8%	— ^d	— ^d	41.4%	19.6%	9.8%	47.5%	— ^d	18.3%
Indirect (total)	65.5%	70.2%	— ^d	— ^d	58.6%	80.4%	90.2%	52.5%	— ^d	81.7%
Via individual characteristics	57.4%	77.4%	35.7%	43.2%	13.0%	27.5%	44.7%	69.4%	46.3%	82.5%
Via cultural reproduction	42.6%	22.6%	64.3%	56.8%	87.0%	72.5%	55.3%	20.6%	53.7%	17.5%
Cultural Transmission										
Total effect of parental cultural capital	.400***	.122***	.454***	.062***	.405***	.105***	.371***	.109***	.457***	.094***
Direct	86.7%	67.7%	91.4%	60.8%	81.9%	36.9%	80.6%	57.4%	90.6%	53.4%
Indirect (=via individual resources)	13.3%	32.3%	8.6%	39.2%	18.1%	63.1%	19.4%	42.6%	9.4%	46.6%

^a Source: Treiman and Szelenyi (1993).
^b Effects on high cultural participation.
^c Effects on material consumption.
^d Direct and indirect effects have opposite values. Accordingly, no percentages were calculated.
 * Significant at $p < .05$.
 ** Significant at $p < .01$.
 *** Significant at $p < .001$.

Parental background and material consumption. Table 3 shows that parental educational attainment as well as parental occupational prestige have significant total effects on material consumption. For this social reproduction, parental education seems to be more important than occupational prestige, since the total effects are about four times as large. A breakdown of the total effects of parental socioeconomic resources reveals that for parental education the ratio between direct and indirect effects is close to equal. So, direct social transmission of material wealth in Eastern Europe is reduced to zero. Years of de-stratification policies have not led to a situation in which parents are no longer successful in transmitting advantageous conditions over to their children. More specifically, the indirect effects of parental educational attainment and occupational prestige are about 70% through individual resources and about 30% through parental cultural capital. Apparently, indirect social reproduction in material wealth mainly occurs through improving a person's social position in terms of educational attainment, income, and occupational prestige.

Parental communist party membership seems to be of importance only for material consumption in Bulgaria and Slovakia. However, the total effects are of only minor importance, i.e., less than $\beta = .050$. In these countries, political transmission predominantly occurs indirectly through strengthening an individual's social position. Likely, the political position of one's parents makes access to elite positions a little easier.

Since a high-culture climate in the parental home produces an affinity for high culture, parental cultural capital is predicted to be meaningful in explaining material wealth as well. Our results confirm this expectation. Although the total effects of parental cultural capital on material consumption are considerably smaller than on high-culture participation, they are certainly substantial, varying between $\beta = .062$ for the Czech Republic and $\beta = .122$ for Bulgaria. Next, the breakdown indicates that parental cultural resources affect a person's wealth mostly directly (around 60%). In some way, cultured parents do succeed in transmitting inequalities, even when individual characteristics are controlled for. An exception, however, is Hungary, where the direct:indirect ratio is reversed. Nevertheless, we conclude that in Eastern Europe direct cultural transmission not only affects high-culture participation, but affects material wealth as well.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Forty years of socialist regimes inevitably must have had repercussions on social inequality in Eastern Europe. It is generally believed that egalitarian policies weakened parents' opportunities to pass advantageous conditions over to their children. Consequently, the impact of parental background on their children's lifestyle is thought to have been reduced. In this article, the determinants of social differentiation on cultural and material lifestyle patterns in Eastern Europe are closely studied. Features traditionally used in sociological studies of inequality, i.e., traditional stratification and mobility research and lifestyle research, were combined into a single explanatory model. More specifically, in this model the impact of parental socioeconomic, political, and cultural resources on cultural

participation and material consumption was examined. To answer the research questions, data were analyzed from cross-nationally comparable surveys held in 1993 in five nations in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). This study thus is one of the first to thoroughly examine mechanisms of intergenerational transmission in postcommunist societies with respect to lifestyle patterns from a cross-national perspective.

Our research questions addressed the differences in cultural and material lifestyles by comparing individual resources to parental background characteristics. Our results with respect to high-culture participation indicate that in the five former socialist countries, parental cultural resources are extremely important. Transmission of inequality in the cultural domain is predominantly effectuated through direct cultural reproduction. In Eastern Europe this direct cultural transmission seems to be even profound than in Western societies, which leads us to conclude that in this respect the ideas of Konrad and Szeleni (1979) on alternative routes of reproduction are confirmed. Parental socioeconomic resources are almost of no direct importance. Further analyses indicate that these resources predominantly influence a person's cultural participation in an indirect way; the effects of social origin on cultural participation mainly run through parental cultural socialization.

In Eastern Europe, direct cultural reproduction seems effective for the acquisition of material wealth as well, but socioeconomic parental resources are more important. In all five countries more highly educated parents succeeded in directly transmitting advantageous qualities onto their offspring. So, more generally, the socialist measures of destratification were less successful in the material domain than in the cultural domain. For material wealth direct and indirect social reproduction affected children more or less equally (50/50). The indirect transmission of inequality occurs mainly through children of high-status backgrounds reaching for higher status positions.

The research reported here clearly illustrates that differentiation in material and cultural lifestyle patterns can be adequately understood if we take into account the direct and indirect mechanisms of intergenerational transmission. Moreover, the present study confirms the idea that the five selected Eastern Europe countries provide an excellent testing ground for the theoretical insights on transmission. It is even more striking that the results reveal profound similarities among these postsocialist nations. This is even more surprising given the national differences in general history, inheritance rules, and the roles the communists played. It therefore strongly underscores the tenability of the explanatory model.

More specifically, our analyses support the conclusions of earlier studies that socialist regimens in Eastern Europe were not successful in reducing levels of inequality. Moreover, the idea that political resources generated better life chances (Djilas, 1957) is to some extent confirmed. For example, in Bulgaria and Slovakia, having a parent who has been a member of the communist party is shown to increase high-culture participation and material wealth. This seems to be in line with the dominant role the Communist party played in these countries before 1989. It is remarkable, though, that we still find strong effects some years

after these communist regimes collapsed. It is also shown that, according to Konrad and Szelenyi's (1979) claim, in postcommunist countries parental cultural resources are significant in transmitting inequalities over generations. Compared to Western societies it seems that in Eastern Europe these cultural resources are even more important (Kolosi, 1989; Niehof, 1997).

A major issue that should be addressed in future studies concerns whether the effects of parental social and cultural resources will change over the next decades in Eastern Europe. The ongoing restructuring of the economies and processes of privatization might affect the current mechanisms of transmission. It remains to be seen whether the mechanisms of intergenerational transmission will slowly emulate the situation found in Western countries. In addition, questions concerning the effects of political resources on lifestyle patterns might be more fully addressed in future studies. They should not focus only on the effect of being a member of a political party, but also on the effects of belonging to the high-ranking political elite, the "nomenclature." In this article, data were mostly obtained from the general population; little was obtained from children of political leaders. Future research employing data from the political elite is necessary. These suggestions for future research stress the importance of our findings. Despite the many attempts in socialist Eastern Europe to de-stratify resource distribution, lifestyle differentiation in these nations in the 1990s was shown to be largely due to social and cultural intergenerational transmission.

APPENDIX 1A

Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables (High-Culture Participation and Material Consumption) for Five Eastern European Countries in 1993^a

Variables (range)	Bulgaria, Mean (SD)	Czech Republic, Mean (SD)	Hungary, Mean (SD)	Poland, Mean (SD)	Slovakia, Mean (SD)
High-culture participation					
High culture participation (percentiles)	50.01 (28.33)	50.01 (28.86)	50.01 (28.67)	50.02 (28.57)	50.01 (28.86)
Goes to museum (times a year)	1.42 (4.10)	1.92 (4.60)	2.13 (3.78)	1.39 (3.16)	2.19 (5.22)
Goes to theatre (times a year)	1.99 (5.04)	2.23 (5.17)	1.83 (4.46)	1.21 (2.71)	2.10 (5.24)
Listens to classical music (times a year)	3.67 (10.78)	6.44 (12.36)	6.45 (9.99)	7.21 (14.28)	8.27 (14.40)
No. of books read (in a year)	11.41 (17.64)	16.27 (18.43)	9.43 (15.16)	10.39 (16.39)	14.96 (18.08)
Goes to library (times a year)	2.89 (9.16)	3.93 (9.43)	2.47 (9.91)	2.48 (8.20)	3.92 (9.95)
Material consumption					
Material consumption (percentiles)	50.01 (28.87)	50.01 (28.87)	50.01 (28.87)	50.01 (28.87)	50.01 (28.87)
Washing machine (0-1)	.35 (.48)	.66 (.47)	.43 (.50)	.61 (.49)	.53 (.50)
VCR (0-1)	.25 (.43)	.24 (.43)	.38 (.49)	.54 (.50)	.23 (.42)
Satellite dish (0-1)	.02 (.14)	.09 (.28)	.21 (.41)	.12 (.33)	.14 (.35)
Microwave (0-1)	.03 (.16)	.08 (.27)	.16 (.36)	.05 (.23)	.08 (.27)
Freezer (0-1)	.06 (.24)	.69 (.46)	.66 (.47)	.46 (.50)	.65 (.48)
Computer (0-1)	.02 (.13)	.06 (.24)	.09 (.29)	.14 (.35)	.07 (.26)
No. of rooms in house (1-10)	3.17 (1.41)	3.11 (1.15)	2.66 (1.18)	2.68 (1.25)	3.38 (1.40)
Size of house in m ² (0-1000)	76.62 (30.15)	56.13 (26.74)	77.11 (31.38)	50.52 (28.95)	68.21 (50.06)
WC (0-1)	.56 (.50)	.96 (.20)	.85 (.35)	.85 (.36)	.89 (.31)
Bathroom (0-1)	.77 (.42)	.97 (.16)	.89 (.32)	.86 (.35)	.96 (.19)
Total number of respondents	3542	4662	3339	2635	3777

^a Source: Treiman and Szelenyi (1993).

APPENDIX 1B

Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables (Individual Characteristics and Parental Resources) for Five Eastern European Countries in 1993^a

Variables (range)	Bulgaria, Mean (SD)	Czech Republic, Mean (SD)	Hungary, Mean (SD)	Poland, Mean (SD)	Slovakia, Mean (SD)
Demographic background					
Woman (0–1)	.53 (.50)	.53 (.50)	.52 (.50)	.51 (.50)	.52 (.50)
Age (25–70)	46.97 (12.50)	46.89 (12.30)	45.87 (12.32)	43.49 (11.95)	44.66 (11.93)
Degree of urbanization (1–5)	2.58 (1.42)	2.46 (1.35)	2.74 (1.46)	2.63 (1.35)	2.20 (1.29)
Married (0–1)	.83 (.38)	.81 (.39)	.80 (.40)	.80 (.40)	.78 (.42)
Employed full-time (0–1)	.61 (.49)	.65 (.48)	.55 (.50)	.63 (.48)	.65 (.48)
No. of children under 6 years old (0–3)	.22 (.52)	.16 (.45)	.20 (.49)	.35 (.67)	.22 (.52)
No. of children over 6 years old (0–9)	.88 (.95)	.91 (1.01)	.91 (.97)	1.11 (1.14)	1.12 (1.13)
Individual characteristics					
Educational attainment (years)	9.72 (3.53)	11.90 (2.89)	10.82 (3.50)	11.10 (3.41)	11.83 (3.26)
Income (percentiles)	50.01 (28.86)	50.01 (28.87)	50.01 (28.87)	50.02 (28.87)	50.01 (28.87)
Occupational prestige (0–100)	36.47 (13.36)	38.83 (12.18)	37.46 (12.54)	39.16 (11.81)	39.86 (12.60)
Affiliation with Communist party (0–1)	.15 (.36)	.16 (.37)	.12 (.32)	.13 (.33)	.16 (.37)
Parental socioeconomic resources					
Parental educational attainment (years)	5.33 (4.00)	9.57 (1.97)	7.25 (2.97)	7.75 (3.32)	8.79 (2.23)
Parental occupational prestige (0–100)	38.24 (10.37)	37.71 (11.47)	35.60 (12.03)	37.74 (10.49)	37.39 (11.84)
Parental political resources					
Parental affiliation communist party (0–1)	.18 (.38)	.28 (.45)	.15 (.36)	.18 (.38)	.17 (.38)
Parental cultural resources					
Parental cultural capital (percentiles)	50.01 (25.30)	50.01 (28.82)	50.01 (27.35)	50.02 (26.87)	50.01 (28.53)
Goes to museum (times a year)	.76 (3.26)	1.26 (3.92)	1.01 (3.78)	.69 (2.50)	.96 (3.51)
Goes to theatre (times a year)	1.06 (3.89)	2.04 (5.48)	1.24 (4.46)	1.00 (3.56)	1.10 (3.58)
Listened to classical music (times a year)	1.32 (6.73)	4.12 (10.88)	2.96 (9.99)	2.76 (9.74)	3.47 (10.03)
No. of books read (in a year)	5.64 (13.49)	15.67 (18.68)	7.66 (15.16)	7.16 (14.54)	11.38 (16.90)
Goes to library (times a year)	2.54 (8.84)	6.70 (12.92)	3.44 (9.91)	2.36 (8.45)	4.14 (10.63)
Total number of respondents	3542	4662	3339	2635	3777

^a Source: Treiman and Szelenyi (1993).

APPENDIX 2

Reliability (Cronbach's α) of Constructed Scales for Parental Cultural Capital, High-Culture Participation, and Material Consumption for Five Eastern European Countries in 1993^a

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Parental cultural capital	.78	.66	.74	.69	.67
High culture participation	.76	.59	.70	.68	.61
Material consumption	.62	.60	.74	.72	.62
Total number of respondents	3542	4662	3339	2635	3777

^a Source: Treiman and Szelenyi (1993).

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